To our knowledge, this paper provides the most comprehensive analysis of firm-level corporate income taxes to date. We use publicly available financial statement information for 12,533 corporations from 79 countries from 1988 to 2007 to estimate country-level effective tax rates (ETRs). We find that the location of a multinational and its subsidiaries substantially affects its worldwide ETR. Japanese firms always faced the highest ETRs. U.S. multinationals are among the highest taxed. Multinationals based in tax havens face the lowest taxes. We find that ETRs have been falling for the last two decades worldwide; however, the ordinal rank from high-tax countries to low-tax countries changed little. We also find little difference between the ETRs of multinationals and domestic-only firms. Besides enhancing our knowledge about international taxes, these findings should provide some empirical underpinning for ongoing policy debates about the taxation of multinational profits.
Introduction
This paper exploits recently available financial statement information about non-U.S.
companies to enhance our understanding of how taxes affect multinationals and to provide some empirical underpinnings for a debate about the competitiveness of countries in the market for tax domicile.
1 It is widely accepted among American tax practitioners and corporate managers that U.S. domicile results in higher total worldwide taxes, that new companies anticipating substantial foreign operations should not incorporate in the U.S., and that companies domiciled outside the U.S. have a tax advantage in the market for corporate control (see Samuels, 2009 , Carroll, 2010 , among many others). Reasons include the U.S.'s use of a worldwide tax system, which diminishes the advantages of operating through subsidiaries located in low-tax foreign countries and makes the U.S. somewhat unique among its trading partners, limits on the deductibility of some expenses, and aggressive federal tax administration. 1 By "domicile," we mean the location of the firm for tax purposes. There is no standard definition of domicile. For example, domicile is the legal residence or site of incorporation in the U.S., but the location of operational headquarters in the UK.
As evidence that other countries dominate the U.S. as a domicile for multinationals and that companies currently domiciled in the U.S. would leave if the tax costs of exiting were not prohibitive, critics of the current U.S. system point to the strong legislation and political pressure that were needed to stem the exodus of U.S. companies through inversions (reincorporations in low-tax countries with no operational impact), following Stanley Works' highly controversial aborted move to Bermuda in 2002. 3 However, concerns about domicile competitiveness are not limited to the U.S. In his study of 278 changes in multinational headquarters involving 19 countries from 1997 to 2007, Voget (2008) shows that relocating to reduce global taxes is a widespread phenomenon. Most recently, the UK has seen several companies leave for domiciles in tax havens. In fact, the Financial Times (September 21, 2008) quoted an anonymous source saying, "As we understand it, half the FTSE 100 is looking at this [redomiciling outside the UK.]." (Braithwaite, 2008) . 4 This inability to compete for domicile contributed to the UK's recent adoption of a territorial system of taxing the foreign profits of its multinationals.
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3 See Desai and Hines (2002) for detailed discussions of the inversions. Capturing the fiery rhetoric in 2002 concerning U.S. inversions, Johnston (2002) reported, "Senior senators from both parties used blunt language today to denounce companies that use Bermuda as a mail drop to reduce their American income taxes by tens of millions of dollars, calling them 'greedy' and 'unpatriotic' tax evaders whose actions could not be tolerated 'in a time of war'." In March, 1999, these issues were center stage in a famous exchange during the testimony of Bob Perlman, Vice President of Taxes for Intel Corporation, before the Senate Finance Committee. Perlman stated, "…if I had known at Intel's founding (over thirty years ago) what I know today about the international tax rules, I would have advised that the parent company be established outside the U.S. This reflects the reality that our Tax Code competitively disadvantages multinationals simply because the parent is a U.S. corporation." (Perlman, 1999 (Werdigier, 2008 and Faith, 2008) , while Kingfisher, Brit Insurance, RSA Insurance, and Prudential, among others, threatened to leave (Werdigier, 2008 , Braithwaite, 2008 . Colin Meadows, the Chief Administrative Officer for Invesco, who moved left the UK for Bermuda in December, 2007, stated "…we wanted to make sure the transaction in moving our domicile was tax neutral for our shareholders. Moving to the U.S. would not have been a tax neutral situation. When it came down to it, it was a very short list of places that we considered and Bermuda was at the top." (Neil, 2007) . Decentering also may explain some of the departures (Desai, 2008) . However, whether the departures are solely or partially tax-driven, the larger and longer-lasting implications for the British people may be the newly formed companies that will never have any roots in the UK. 5 Although UK multinationals widely welcomed the exemption of foreign dividends under a territorial system, some question whether it is enough to stifle the exodus. Ian Brimicombe, head of tax at AstraZeneca, doubted that the change in the law would bring back the firms that had already exited the UK and noted that companies with intellectual property or finance subsidiaries were still disadvantaged in the UK. (Houlder, 2008) .
Conversely, scholars have long documented that multinationals are adept at arranging their affairs to undo differences in taxation across countries. 6 By shifting income from high-tax to low-tax countries through transfer pricing, using hybrid entities that are treated as corporations in some countries and flow-through entities in others, stripping profits from high-tax countries through intracompany financing, repatriating under favorable tax conditions, and other tax avoidance mechanisms, multinationals mitigate the impact of domicile in a high-tax country. 7 Furthermore, some claim that the tax avoidance opportunities that arise from conducting business in multiple countries gives multinationals an advantage over their domestic-only counterparts.
8 6 See Blouin and Krull (2009) , , Desai, et al (2006) , Gordon and Hines (2002) , Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) , Collins and Shackelford (1997) , among many others, over the last two decades.
Moreover, with regards to any possible domicile disadvantages that U.S. multinationals might face, Stephen Shay, the deputy assistant secretary for international tax affairs at the U.S. Treasury, stated last month that the size of the U.S. domestic market and the fact that other countries with smaller economies have to rely more on cross-border trading renders the U.S. unique and incomparable with other countries, thus justifying differences in U.S. taxation of multinationals (Coder, 2010) . In effect, he argues that the economic advantages 7 Consistent with U.S. multinationals' exploiting their ability to report profits in locations with more favorable tax systems than the U.S., the foreign affiliates of American companies reported more of their aggregate net income in the Netherlands (13%), Luxembourg (8%), and Bermuda (8%) than any country in 2006 (http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdop.htm). Other locations with profits that far exceeded assets, sales and employees were Ireland (7%), Switzerland (6%), Singapore (4%), and UK islands in the Caribbean (3%). For comparison, 7% of the aggregate net income of U.S. foreign affiliates was reported to Canada (the U.S. largest trading partner) and the UK, while only 2% was reported in high-tax Japan and Germany. 8 For example, after the HM Revenue and Customs National Audit Office (2007) reported that a third of the UK's 700 largest companies paid no tax in the 2005-2006 financial year, Bill Dodwell of Deloitte stated, "That 700 of the largest companies and groups are only paying 54 per cent of corporation tax shows the giant contribution of small companies. It is probably because many are less international and so have different planning opportunities." (Houlder, 2007) . Referring to U.S. multinationals, Johnston (2008) 10 Ideally, companies would be randomly assigned to countries and permitted time to rearrange their accounting, legal, investing, financing, production, marketing, and other activities in light of the tax particulars of their assigned country. We would then compare the global taxes for each company, recognizing that their international tax planning acumen might enable the companies assigned to high-tax countries to undo any tax disadvantages. Unfortunately, such experiments are impossible. Thus, we are relegated to examining the actual taxes paid (as estimated using financial statement disclosures) by multinationals domiciled in countries for non-random reasons, which we can only partially control for in our tests.
The principal finding from the study is that domicile continues to substantially affect multinationals' ETRs. Even though many firms reportedly engage in increasingly aggressive international tax planning with transfer pricing, hybrid entities and other tax avoidance strategies, they apparently are unable to completely undo the differences in tax law across countries.
Consequently, many countries continue to collect large sums of corporate income taxes even though tax havens and other low-tax countries exist. In fact, we find that the ETRs for multinationals in high-tax countries double those in low-tax countries. In particular, multinationals domiciled in Japan face the highest ETRs, followed by those domiciled in the U.S., France and Germany. Multinationals domiciled in tax havens enjoy the lowest ETRs. In some countries, multinationals face higher ETRs than their domestic counterparts; in others, multinationals face lower ETRs. However, there is no global pattern.
Furthermore, we find that, although ETRs have steadily declined worldwide over the last two decades (most notably in Japan, the UK, and the Netherlands), the ordinal rank from hightax countries to low-tax countries has changed little. Furthermore, ETRs vary widely across industries throughout the world with construction companies and retailers typically facing ETRs double those of miners and information firms. However, the variation is similar across countries.
In almost all countries, the same industries are high-tax and low-tax, and high-tax countries tend to tax all industries more heavily than low-tax countries do. We also find the ETR for a multinational is greater if its subsidiaries are located in high-tax countries than if its subsidiaries are located in low-tax countries. For example, U.S. multinationals can reduce their ETR by locating a subsidiary in a tax haven. A subsidiary in the Cayman Islands (Bermuda) reduces the cash ETR by 3.1 (1.6) percentage points.
Data limitations have prevented scholars from estimating the marginal tax cost associated with the domicile of multinationals. An early study, Collins and Shackelford (1995) , uses total income tax expense to compute ETRs for four countries (Canada, Japan, the UK, and the U.S.) and ten years (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) . Subsequently, Collins and Shackelford (2003) adds Germany and estimates ETRs from 1992-1997; however, with data for only eight Japanese firm-years and 36
German firm-years, they are effectively limited to studying three countries. In both studies, they conclude that the parents of multinationals domiciled in the U.S. and the UK faced similar ETRs, both of which exceeded the parent ETRs in Canada. In neither study did they have information about the location of the company's subsidiaries. Two other studies compare (total income tax expense) ETRs across countries. Lu and Swenson (2000) and Lee and Swenson (2008) document average ETRs for a wide range of countries for 1995-1998 and 2006-2007, respectively 
Regression Equation
To compare the tax rates of multinationals and domestic firms across countries and to determine whether multinationals and domestics in the same country face different tax rates, we could simply use the actual firm-level ETRs. However, erroneous inferences about the level of taxation across countries could be reached because companies are not randomly assigned across countries. For example, if the technology sector faces relatively low taxes throughout the world because of tax incentives for research, then countries with disproportionately large number of technology firms might appear to enjoy lower levels of taxation than other countries when the difference actually arises because of the industry mix. Therefore, to control for such possible industry, year, and firm size differences across countries, we estimate a modified version of the pooled, cross-sectional regression equation developed in Collins and Shackelford (1995): 11 where: the effective tax rate for firm i in year t.
an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is domiciled in country j in year t, equal to 0 otherwise.
11 Collins and Shackelford's (1995) (1), one industry and one year have to be excluded from the regression. To determine which industry to leave out, we calculate the mean ETR in each industry (two-digit NAICS) and then determine the median of those means. The industry with the median mean is the one left out. We implement a similar procedure on the years. 13 Note that the magnitude of the domestic and multinational ETRs cannot be directly compared with the actual ETRs from the financial statements, which serve as the dependent variable. The domestic and multinational ETRs are the tax rates, conditional on industry, year, and size. That said, our empirical analysis shows that the estimated ETRs are very similar to the actual ETRs from the financial statements.
percentile ranks of Total Assets, Revenues, and Equity. Prior studies of the impact of size on ETRs have been inconclusive. Rego (2003) , Omer et al. (1993) , and Zimmerman (1983) find a negative relation, consistent with economies of scale and political costs. Conversely, Armstrong, et al. (2010 ), Jacob (1996 , Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Mills (1998) find no relation.
The ETRs are collected from each firm's financial statements. 14 The ETR denominator is net income before income taxes (NIBT). Since financial reporting rules vary across countries and thus affect the computation of NIBT, we conduct sensitivity tests using total revenues and an adjusted net income as denominators.
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Three different numerators are used in our ETR computations: (i) actual cash taxes paid (cash ETR), (ii) current worldwide income tax expense (current ETR), and (iii) total worldwide income tax expense (total ETR).
Results are qualitatively the same.
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One disadvantage of the cash ETR, compared with the current and total ETRs, is that it includes all taxes paid during the year regardless of the year in which the income related to those All measures are collected from the company's publicly available financial statements. Because the focus of this study is on the actual corporate income taxes paid, cash ETR is the superior numerator. Unfortunately, not all countries require firms to disclose the actual taxes paid during that year in their financial statements. Thus, to expand our sample, we turn to the current ETR in some tests. However, it, too, is not a mandatory disclosure in all countries. Thus, to maximize the observations in the study, we occasionally use the total ETR.
14 Note that the ETRs in this study are not marginal tax rates, as detailed in Scholes, et al., 2009 . They ignore implicit taxes, cannot assess who bears the burden of corporate income taxes, and cannot capture incentives to employ new capital (see Fullerton, 1980, and Bradford and Fullerton, 1981 , for a discussion of marginal effective tax rates). Neither are they the tax rates related to investment decisions developed in Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Gordon, et al (2003) . 15 Adjusted net income is intended to add back two key expenses whose accounting rules vary across countries, namely depreciation expense and research and development expense. Using revenues as the denominator goes even further and eliminates any cross-country variation in expenses. 16 See Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) , Graham, et al, 2010 , Dyreng et al, 2008 , and Hanlon (2003 , among others, for detailed discussions of these three measures, how they are computed, and potential limitations.
taxes was earned. For example, cash taxes paid could include additional taxes arising from an audit of past years' tax returns. Thus, the numerator may include taxes related to income from years, other than the current year, while the denominator (book income before taxes) is limited to income from the current year. In contrast, with current income tax expense (which is designed to capture the taxes paid in the current year attributable to economic activity during the current year) as the numerator, both the numerator and the denominator contain the current year's economic activities alone. That said, because our estimates are based on a large sample of firmyears, we doubt that any mismatching for the cash ETR affects the inferences drawn from this analysis. Consistent with that expectation, conclusions are qualitatively identical whether cash taxes paid, current tax expense, or total tax expense is the numerator.
Sample
We use two different databases to collect a sample of firms for this study. To collect information about the location of ultimately-owned subsidiaries, we use the Orbis database.
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We include all parents that have at least one subsidiary. We then match these parents to their financial statement information in the Compustat databases. We collect three different tax variables: total tax expense, current tax expense, and cash taxes paid. The main tests in the paper use current tax expense, so it is that sample we describe in detail here. If a firm-year does not report current tax expense but does report both total and deferred tax expense, we calculate current tax expense as total less deferred. As a validity check on the data, we delete all observations for which the difference between the ETR with total tax expense in the numerator and the ETR with the sum of current and deferred tax expense in the numerator is greater than one percentage point.
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The Orbis subsidiary measure has a serious flaw. Orbis only reports the subsidiary information as of the most recent updating of the information.
We attempt to mitigate the impact of outliers and errors in the data by limiting the sample to observations with non-negative ETR less than or equal to 70%. 20 We are unable to assess the extent to which this data limitation affects the conclusions drawn from this study. However, to mitigate the potential for miscoding the existence and location of foreign subsidiaries, we limit the primary tests in this paper to firm-years since 2002. than in 2004, and so forth. We arbitrarily select the last five years for which we have data as the cut-off for our primary tests in the hope that the miscoding is of an acceptable level for these most recent years. In subsequent tests, we present estimated coefficients from separate regressions for each year, and in untabulated tests, we estimate one regression that uses all of the firm-years. Conclusions are similar regardless of the sample period.
19 To further reduce concerns about inaccurate data, we eliminate from the sample any country for which more than 50% of the observations of current tax expense are zero. 20 For example, if a company had no subsidiary in Canada before 2007 (the most recent year in the database) and then incorporated a subsidiary in Canada in 2007, we would erroneously treat the company as having had a Canadian subsidiary for all years in our sample. Likewise, if a company had a subsidiary in Canada for all years before 2007 and then liquidated the Canadian subsidiary in 2006, we would erroneously treat the company as not having had a subsidiary in Canada for any year in our sample. 21 Another advantage of limiting the analysis to recent years is that it mitigates potential survivorship bias. The Orbis database is limited to companies presently in existence. Thus, our analysis is limited to firms that have survived throughout the investigation period. By restricting the sample to firm-years since 2002, we reduce the deleterious effects of survivorship bias.
included on their own and our main tests are conducted and results are reported using these 26 countries and groups. For the 26 countries and groups, In general, the three tax rate columns paint a similar picture. Countries with high statutory tax rates tend to have high ETR. One notable exception is multinationals domiciled in Bermuda and Cayman Islands. They face the zero statutory rates but their ETRs are not much lower than those in most other countries. This discrepancy between statutory and effective tax rates is consistent with multinationals in tax havens having extensive foreign operations in hightax countries. Even though they may face no taxes on their domestic income, they still must pay taxes abroad.
The numbers reported are the weighted average rates, where the weighting was done by number of firm-years. In the full sample, domestics (multinationals) faced average statutory tax rates of 39% (38%). 22 We use the combined corporate statutory tax rate calculated for the 30 OECD countries and available at www.oecd.org (Table II .1). For the non-OECD countries in our sample, we use the maximum rate in data kindly provided by Kevin Hassett. Furthermore, the difference between the actual ETR and the estimated ETR is never more than four percentage points. Thus, we infer from the similarity between the actual and estimated
Primary Findings

Do the ETRs estimated from the regression coefficients differ from the actual ETRs?
ETRs that the control variables (for industry, year and size) have little impact on the coefficients of interest. This pattern holds throughout the paper, suggesting that the inferences drawn in this study would be similar whether we used the actual ETRs from the financial statements or the ETRs estimated in the regression. For brevity, we will focus exclusively on the estimated ETRs in the remainder of the paper. 23 To illustrate, for Australian companies, using cash taxes paid, the mean raw ETR from the financial statements for domestic-only firms is 25%, while the estimated cash ETR for domestics is 23%. The same figures for multinationals are 25% (raw) and 23% (estimated). In the center of the table, when current income tax expense is the numerator, the mean raw ETR for domestic-only firms is 17%. The estimate also is 17%. For multinationals, the raw (estimated) current ETR is 20% (18%). At the far right, we find that when the total income tax expense is the numerator, the mean raw (estimated) ETR for domestics is 23% (23%) and for multinationals is 25% (24%).
Do ETRs differ between domestics and multinationals?
Next, we compare the estimated ETRs for domestic-only firms with those for multinationals. We have enough firm-years to report estimated domestic cash ETRs for seven countries or groups of countries (Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Singapore, UK, U.S. and Asia).
The estimated domestic cash ETRs for these countries are within two percentage points of their multinational counterparts with two exceptions: Canada's domestic cash ETR is 13%, while its multinational cash ETR is 18%; Malaysia's domestic cash ETR is 24%, while its multinational cash ETR is 17%. These also are the only two countries where the multinational and domestic cash ETRs are significantly different from each other at the 0.05 level (as indicated in Table 2 with an asterisk). The domestic cash ETR and the multinational cash ETR estimate for the U.S.
are the same, 20%.
As mentioned above, there are more firm-years when current income tax expense or total income tax expense are used as the numerator. This larger number of observations enables us to report 19 domestic current ETRs and 22 domestic total ETRs. The correlation between these domestic ETRs and their multinational counterparts is 78% for the current ETRs and 88% for the total ETRs. The absolute value of the difference between the domestic and the multinational ETRs is two percentage points for both current ETRs and total ETRs. The largest differences in absolute value are Sweden's current ETRs, which are 16% for multinationals but only 8% for domestics, and Germany's current ETRs, which are 22% for multinationals but only 15% for We could add Russia and Africa by using total ETRs. However, ETR estimates are substantially larger using total ETRs, which is not surprising since deferred tax liabilities usually exceed deferred tax assets (Poterba, et al. 2009 ). Thus, it appears that using current ETRs closely approximates actual tax payments, but using total ETRs overstates the corporate tax payments. That said, the rank order remains similar across countries and correlation between cash (current) ETRs and total ETRs across countries is 86% (94%). In particular, We infer from this analysis of cash, current, and total multinational ETRs that the domicile of the multinational significantly affects a firm's ETR. After controlling for industry, year, and size, we find that ETRs in the highest taxed countries are two to three times larger than those in the least heavily taxed countries. The rank order of the countries holds across ETR measures. Japan, the U.S., France and Germany are always among the highest taxed countries
Does the domicile of a multinational affect its ETR?
(Australia only appears to be a high-tax country when we use cash taxes paid). Tax havens, such as the Cayman Islands and Bermuda, dominate the low-tax countries. Furthermore, OECD countries consistently have higher ETRs than do other countries. Ignoring the groups of countries (e.g., Asia, Tax Havens, etc.), the mean current ETR for the eight non-OECD countries is 15% and the mean current ETR for the 11 OECD countries is 20%. In fact, except for South Africa at 21% and Malaysia at 17%, all eight non-OECD countries have lower current ETRs than any of the 11 OECD countries.
Have ETRs changed over time?
The findings above are for firm-years from 2003 to 2007. By combining years, we increase the number of observations per country, enabling us to study more countries. However, by combining years, we may mask cross-temporal changes in tax law. Thus, we next report annual estimated ETRs, using the complete sample of firm-years and modifying equation (1) ETRs because we find no consistent differences between them, and current ETRs alone are reported because they provide more observations and closely approximate ETRs estimated using the more desirable tax measure, cash taxes paid.
We find that the high-tax to low-tax rank across countries has changed little over the two decades. In 1988, the Japanese multinational ETR was the highest at 36% (11 percentage points ahead of the next country, UK). In 2007, they were the highest at 34% (seven percentage points higher than Russia, the country with the next largest ETR). In fact, in every year Japanese current ETRs are substantially higher than those in any country. 24 Though beyond the scope of this study, Japan's remarkable ability to sustain substantially higher tax rates than its trading partners throughout two decades warrants further investigation. Ishi (2001) and Griffith and Klemm (2004) (among others) document the gap, but we are aware of no study that attempts to ascertain the reasons why the gap has persisted for such a long period. To summarize, despite steady global declines in ETRs, the rank order of countries has remained remarkably constant over time. Japan's ETRs continued to far exceed those from any other country. In fact, the smallest Japanese ETRs over the two decades (33% in 2005 and 2006) would have exceeded the ETR for any other country in any year that we investigated. Similarly, the tax havens have consistently enjoyed the lowest ETRs. However, the spread between hightax countries and tax havens has narrowed over the two decades because the tax havens began with low tax rates and maintained them, while all high-tax countries have reduced their ETRs.
Netherlands (ten percentage points
Finally, the U.S. ETR has declined, but less so than the ETRs for other countries. Consequently, U.S. ETRs have risen from slightly above-average two decades ago to near the worldwide penultimate, trailing only those in Japan.
Do ETRs vary across industries?
To assess whether ETRs vary across industries, we estimate a modified equation (1) using current ETRs and industry groupings based on two-digit NAICS codes. We group twodigit codes to ensure that each reported industry has at least 1,000 firm-years. All observations are included in the regressions, but only cells with twenty or more observations are reported.
Manufacturers comprise 42% of the firm-years. 
U.S. (36%) have the most variation across industry. These findings suggest that Australian and
British tax law have fewer industry-specific provisions than do the tax laws in the countries with greater industry ETR variation.
We infer from the results in Table 4 that ETRs vary widely across industries and industry ETRs vary widely within countries. Nonetheless, the relative ETR across industries seems similar across all countries. Furthermore, high-tax countries tend to tax all industries more than low-tax countries do. Finally, scholars should note that failure to control for cross-industry variation in ETRs could lead to erroneous inferences about tax burdens across countries. For example, although only 3% of all sample companies are in Mining, 24% of Canadian companies are in that industry. Since Mining is a lightly taxed industry, Canada might appear to be a lowertaxed country than it would if its industry mix was more representative of the global mix. This difference in industry mix should not affect our estimates, however, because we control for industry in equation (1).
Additional Tests
The data enable us to conduct a battery of additional tests and robustness checks, which we discuss briefly in this section. We conduct these tests using the current tax expense sample shown in Table 2 but do not separate domestic and multinational firms within countries. In every case, the inferences drawn above hold.
One, it is difficult to determine where the profits generated from intangible assets are earned. As a result, firms with large amounts of intangible assets may be better able to avoid taxes (see discussions in , Mutti and Grubert, 2007 among many others). To assess whether firms with greater amounts of intangibles have lower ETRs, we would ideally sort firms based on their levels of intangible assets. Unfortunately, information about the amount of intangible assets is not publicly available. Thus, we turn to an observable figure, total research and development expenses, which, we assume, is positively correlated with the firm's level of intangibles. We estimate equation (1) for those firm-years with positive values for research and development expenses, modifying the equation to include a categorical variable for those firm-years where research and development expense as a percentage of total assets is above the median. Consistent with high intangible firms having lower ETRs, we find that the coefficient on the categorical variable is -1.8% and highly significant.
Two, some have conjectured that a territorial system collects less revenue than a worldwide system. Concerns about the revenue implications of excluding dividend taxation under a territorial system has become of central importance since the UK and Japan in December, 2008, decided to revamp their international tax laws by shifting from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system. Meanwhile, President Obama has proposed to strengthen the U.S.'s worldwide tax system by restricting deferral of U.S. taxation on foreign profits.
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Three, in countries with imputation, the corporate income tax serves as a form of withholding tax because the corporate tax (or some part of it) can be used to offset shareholders' dividend taxes. Thus, it is possible that corporate tax planning is less important in imputation countries because firms in those countries have less incentive to lower their ETRs than do those in classical systems, such as the U.S., where corporate taxes do not offset shareholder taxes. We test this possibility by modifying equation (1) to include a categorical variable that indicates whether the firm is domiciled in a country with any form of imputation. We find that the estimated coefficient on the imputation variable is insignificant.
To test the impact of a worldwide system on ETRs, we estimate equation (1), after adding a categorical variable equal to one if the parent country has a worldwide tax system, and zero otherwise. We find that the worldwide coefficient is insignificant.
Four, another cross-country difference is whether tax losses can be carried back to offset the prior year's taxable income. 27 When we add a categorical variable indicating whether a country permits losses to be carried back, we find that the coefficient on that variable is not statistically significant. (2005), among many others, for proposals about U.S. international tax law reform. Interestingly, a principal cost of repealing deferral for some companies would be the deleterious impact on book income. Under current tax law, APB 23 permits firms to classify foreign profits as permanently reinvested, which enables them to report no deferred income taxes for any possible U.S. taxes to be paid at repatriation. Repealing deferral would render this discretion under APB 23 irrelevant. This possibility led Ralph Hellmann, lead lobbyist for the Information Technology Industry Council, to state that the benefit of APB 23 deferral "…hits the bottom line of companies more than any other issue right now. We have to defeat it [repeal of deferral]." (Drucker, 2009) . 27 This information is obtained from International Tax Summaries prepared by Deloitte and available through its website. 28 We conduct no tests concerning the carryforward of losses because Estonia is the only country that does not permit it.
Five, the corporate income tax is only one of many taxes, and in many countries, it is a relatively minor source of government revenue. To the extent countries rely on alternative taxes, they may need less revenue from corporate income taxes, which are the sole tax used to compute ETRs. Alternatively, high income tax countries may levy high taxes across the board.
Consistent with a trade-off among revenue sources, we find that the value-added tax rate is negatively correlated with ETRs.
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Six, we include the maximum statutory corporate income tax rate in equation (1). As would be expected, we find a positive coefficient on the statutory rate, and the relative ranks of the countries/groups somewhat altered. This implies that the ETRs are driven by differences in both tax rates and tax bases.
When we exclude companies domiciled in the U.S. (the only major country without a value-added tax), the correlation is more strongly negative. To determine whether the value-added tax affects the inferences drawn above, we include the valueadded tax rate in equation (1) and find a positive and significant coefficient estimate. However, inferences about the relative ETRs across countries are unaltered.
Seven, the sample excludes all firm-years with losses (i.e., negative NIBT). In this sensitivity test, we add back the 5,045 firm-years with losses and actual ETRs (from the financial statements) that equal zero and estimate equation (1).
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29 We thank Kevin Hassett for providing us with the valued-add tax data.
By definition, adding these loss firmyears lowers the estimated ETRs. We find that the inclusion of loss firm-years has inconsequential impact on the relative high-tax to low-tax rank across the countries: the Japanese ETR remain the highest at 28%, two percentage points above the Italian ETR. The Bermudan ETR is the lowest at 6%, one percentage point below the Cayman Islands'.
Eight, the sample includes firm-years with zero ETRs as long as their NIBT was positive.
In this robustness check, we drop those 2,418 firm-years with non-positive ETRs as reported in the financial statements. By definition, eliminating these zero ETR firms increases the estimated ETRs. We find that the deletion of non-positive ETRs has inconsequential impact on the relative high-tax to low-tax rank across the countries: Japanese ETR is 36%, seven percentage points above those for Russia, the country with the next highest ETR. The Bermudan and Cayman
Islands ETRs are the lowest at 14%. Once again, the U.S. and European countries generally have higher ETRs than Asian countries.
All in all, we conclude from this series of additional tests that the earlier inferences about
ETRs hold. Next, we expand the domestic-multinational dichotomy to consider whether the domiciles of foreign subsidiaries affect ETRs.
Results from Comparing Foreign Subsidiaries
How much does the location of its foreign subsidiaries affect a multinational's ETR?
In Equation (1), we use the presence of a foreign subsidiary to distinguish multinationals from domestic-only firms. In this section, we replace that single categorical variable with categorical variables for all locations of foreign subsidiaries. The coefficients on the foreign subsidiary variables enable us to assess the extent to which the location of a foreign subsidiary affects the tax burdens of its parent. The regression equation is:
where: an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i reports a subsidiary in country k, equal to 0 otherwise.
All other variables are defined the same as in equation (1). The estimated regression coefficient on SUB is the estimated impact on ETRs arising from having a subsidiary in that foreign country.
We continue to use the same 26 groups as in the previous section for the parents but allow countries to have their own SUB indicator if they host subsidiaries of 500 or more parents.
Each firm-year has one country in which its COUNTRY variable is coded one. However, it has n SUBs coded one, where n is the number of different countries in which the parent has at least one subsidiary.
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We begin with the original sample of 35,673 firm-years (from 2003-2007) with current income tax expense as the numerator for the ETR. We lose 555 firm-years whose companies indicated that they had a foreign subsidiary (which was adequate for coding it as a multinational in estimating equation (1)), but did not specify the location of the foreign subsidiary, rendering it unusable for estimating equation (2). For these remaining 35,188 firm-years, there are 154,994
SUB variables with a value of one. All 47 subsidiary locations have at least 1,600 firm-years.
The UK is the most popular location for foreign subsidiaries with 9,730 firm-years. (2) should be the same as the COUNTRY coefficients from equation (1), except to the extent that identifying the location of a firm's foreign subsidiaries, as opposed to just identifying the existence of a foreign subsidiary provides information. It seems plausible that knowing the subsidiary's domicile would substantially affect inferences because foreign subsidiaries are not randomly distributed across parents.
Multinationals from some countries might be more likely to operate in high-tax countries (e.g.,
French companies are more likely to have a subsidiary in high-tax Germany than are Indian 31 For example, if a U.S. parent has subsidiaries in Canada, Germany, and Bermuda, , , , and would be coded one, while all other and variables would be coded zero.
companies, which might partially account for the higher ETRs in France.). That said, we find that specifying the location of the foreign subsidiary in the regression only results in three COUNTRY coefficients changing more than two percentage points from the corresponding COUNTRY coefficients in Table 2 . The domestic Swedish tumbles from 14% to 8%, the German ETR decreases from 20% to 15% and the Canadian ETR declines from 17% to 14%.
We now turn our attention to Panel B and the SUB coefficients. We expect cross-country variation in the SUB coefficients to the extent that locating a foreign subsidiary in a country affects the multinational's ETR. For example, if a firm can shift profits from a high-tax country to a tax haven, then its ETR should be lower and the SUB coefficient for the haven should reflect those tax savings. The SUB coefficients range from a 1.8 percentage points decrease in ETRs for multinationals with a subsidiary in Taiwan to a 1.4 percentage points increase in ETRs for multinationals with a subsidiary in Africa. These SUB coefficients are conditional on the location of all other foreign subsidiaries. Thus, they can be interpreted as the incremental impact on ETRs of having a subsidiary in a particular foreign country. Consistent with expectations, some of the more negative SUB coefficients include tax havens, such as the Cayman Islands (-1.6 percentage points), Singapore (-0.8 percentage points), Tax Havens (-0.7 percentage points), British Virgin Islands (-0.7 percentage points) and Luxembourg (-0.6 percentage points).
Some of the more positive SUB coefficients include countries with relatively high taxes, e.g., Japan (1.2 percentage points) and France (1.1 percentage points). When we segregate the sample based on OECD membership (untabulated), we find that having a foreign subsidiary in an OECD country increases current ETRs by 0.2 percentage points, while having a foreign subsidiary in a non-OECD country reduces ETRs by 0.4 percentage points. This difference is significant at the 0.01 level, using a t-test of the means, which is consistent with higher taxes among OECD countries.
Contrary to this pattern of high-tax countries resulting in highly tax subsidiaries, we find that having a U.S. subsidiary lowers a multinational's ETR by 0.8 percentage points. This finding is consistent with the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (2008) report that U.S.-controlled U.S. companies pay more taxes than foreign-controlled U.S. companies. It provides support for arguments by U.S. companies that they face a competitive disadvantage in the U.S. marketplace, since most non-U.S. multinationals (Japanese multinationals being the notable exception) already lower ETRs before the added bonus of ETR reduction when they establish an American subsidiary.
Finally, we measure the correlation between the COUNTRY coefficients and the SUB coefficients in Table 5 for the 25 countries with both COUNTRY and SUB coefficients. If countries tax their domestic-only firms similarly to the foreign-controlled companies domiciled in their country, then the COUNTRY coefficients (indicating ETRs for domestic-only firms)
should be positively correlated with the SUB coefficients (indicating the incremental ETR for multinationals with subsidiaries in that country). Consistent with this expectation, we find a positive correlation between the COUNTRY and SUB coefficients of 36%, which is significant at the 0.05 level using a one-tailed test. We interpret these findings as evidence that countries that tax their domestic-only firms heavily also tax their foreign subsidiaries heavily and vice versa.
Though not surprising, to our knowledge, this is the first documentation that domestic-only firms and foreign subsidiaries in the same country face relatively similar levels of taxation.
Parent-subsidiary interactions
The prior section restricts the SUB coefficient to be the same, regardless of the domicile of the parent. In this section, we alter the research design to allow for the possibility that foreign subsidiaries affect the ETRs of their parents differently depending on the domicile of the parent.
Specifically, we modify equation (2) by replacing the SUB variables with interactions between the COUNTRY and SUB variables. We then compare the coefficients on the interactions to assess the extent to which subsidiaries affect parents differently, depending on whether the parent is in a high-tax or low-tax country. Table 6 presents the estimated interaction coefficients (no coefficients are shown unless there are at least 50 observations in a cell) for major parent locations and select subsidiary countries. The dependent variable is always current ETR, except for the last column, which reports results for the U.S. only, using the cash ETR as the dependent variable (no other country has enough cash ETR observations to warrant tabulation).
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For brevity, we comment here only on U.S. inbound and outbound activities and leave the many other statistics in this table for the reader to peruse. Beginning with inbound investment, Table 5 shows that a subsidiary in the U.S. lowers a multinational's current ETR by 0.8 percentage points, on average. Table 6 expands the analysis to show that having a subsidiary in the U.S. affects a multinational differently, depending on its domicile. The marginal effect of an American subsidiary on current ETRs ranges from a decrease of 7.9 percentage points for a Dutch parent to an increase of 3.3 percentage points for a Canadian parent.
For outbound investment from the U.S., we turn to the last column in the table, which shows the marginal effect on cash taxes paid for an American multinational having operations in various countries. We find no evidence that investments in high-tax, developed countries increase U.S. companies' cash ETRs. Locating a subsidiary in the 25 OECD countries listed in Table 6 companion high-tax countries' impact on ETRs. We look forward to future work that attempts to grapple with the clustering of foreign subsidiaries and its impact on ETRs.
Cross-country Comparisons of Book-tax Conformity
The paper closes by using the data in this study to address the ongoing, global debate about increasing the alignment between book and tax accounting.
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To shed some light on cross-country variation in book-tax conformity, we substitute the absolute value of the difference between pretax book income and an estimate of taxable income as the numerator in equation (1) and keep all other variables the same. It is necessary to take the absolute values because temporary differences reverse. By taking the absolute value, we capture differences arising from both book income exceeding taxable income and taxable income exceeding book income. We follow conventional measures by estimating the unobservable taxable income as current tax expense grossed-up by the statutory tax rate.
Although continuing adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards throughout the world is standardizing financial accounting rules, countries still vary in the extent to which they permit transactions to be accounted for differently for books and for taxes. Historically, in some countries book and tax accounting have been very similar, often statutorily set. In other countries, particularly current and former members of the British Empire, book treatment serves as a default for tax accounting, but many transactions are treated differently.
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35 See Hanlon, et al (2005) , Desai (2006) , Shackelford (2006 ), McClelland and Mills (2007 ), Freedman (2004 , Graham, et al (2010) , Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) , and Atwood, et al (2010) , among many others, for a discussion of the pros and cons of increased book-tax conformity.
The new numerator is intended to capture the extent to which book and tax accounting diverge. If book and tax were perfectly conformed, i.e., book and tax accounting rules were identical, the numerator would always be zero. As they diverge, the numerator increases. Thus, the estimated regression coefficient on COUNTRY will be decreasing in conformity.
We find considerable differences across countries in book-tax conformity. Table 7 reports the COUNTRY coefficients from estimating equation (1) COUNTRY coefficients serve as a measure of the extent to which book and tax accounting diverge, conditional on the controls in equation (1) for industry, year and size. Our "conformity index" ranges from low divergence of 37% (New Zealand) to high divergence of 86% (Canada) with a mean (median) [standard deviation] of 53% (52%) [10%] , implying that the absolute value of total book-tax differences (the numerator) equal about half of pre-tax profits. The U.S.
conformity index is 56%, ninth highest among the 37 countries for which we compute an index.
As expected, we find that the 11 countries currently or once under the British Crown have less book-tax conformity (a mean of 58%) than the other 26 countries (a mean of 51%). The difference is significant at the 0.05 level. To the extent book and tax accounting diverge because some accounting earnings are excluded from the tax base and this narrowing of the tax base requires a higher tax rate, we would expect a positive correlation between the conformity index and the statutory tax rate. Contrary to expectations, we find the Pearson correlation between each country's conformity index and its mean statutory rate during the investigation period is not statistically significant. Although we have no prediction, we also find no difference in the conformity index between OECD countries and non-OECD countries. Likewise, we find no significant difference in the conformity index between countries that were required to use IFRS during the investigation period and those that were not required to use IFRS.
A problem that any new index faces is determining whether it actually measures the underlying phenomena that it is designed to capture. It is beyond the scope of this paper to thoroughly test our index; however, we can compare it with a recent one developed in Atwood, et al (2010) . They compute country-year measures of book-tax conformity using the root mean squared error from regressions of current tax expense on domestic pretax income, foreign pretax income, and total dividends. 37 Because their index comes from the variance of the residuals, it depends critically upon correctly specifying their model. It also assigns heavier weight to observations further from the mean. When we examine the 29 countries and three years (2003) (2004) (2005) ) that the studies have in common, we find a reasonably high level of agreement. 38 The
Pearson correlation for the two indices is 0.42. Generally, both indices identify the same countries as high conformity and low conformity. 39 Two notable exceptions are South Africa, who we identify as high conformity and Atwood, et al (2010) identify as high divergence and
China, who we identify as high divergence and they identify as high conformity.
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Finally, we use the Atwood, et al (2010) book-tax conformity measure to assess the impact of cross-country differences in book and tax accounting on our Table 2 estimates of cross-country ETRs. (We cannot use our own index, since it is computed using the same data that we use to compute our measures of ETRs.) Consistent with book-tax conformity mattering, we find a positive correlation between their measure and the absolute value of the difference between a firm's maximum statutory tax rate and its ETR. When include their conformity measure in equation (1), we find that the coefficient on the conformity measure is positive and 37 They include dividends to control for differences between imputation and classical system countries. Their model ignores other tax and non-tax differences across countries or industries. 38 Atwood et al. (2010) 39 One problem that both indices face is that they base their measures on reported income and taxes. An ideal measure of a country's mandated book-tax conformity would exclude the effects of earnings and tax management. We thank Jana Raedy for identifying this limitation. We look forward to research that dichotomizes the legal conformity from any discretionary behavior response. 40 China has been transitioning away from conformity. In 2002 it adopted a comprehensive Accounting System for Business Enterprises that lessened book-tax conformity by allowing firms to provide for asset-impairment losses (Lin, 2006) . significant, implying that cross-country differences in financial reporting may partially explain difference is ETRs. However, the rank order of high-tax to low-tax countries is unaffected.
Closing Remarks
To our knowledge, this paper provides the most comprehensive analysis of international corporate income taxes to date. It is the first study to compute effective taxes using cash taxes paid and current income tax expense data for thousands of companies around the world. Our principal findings include: The domiciliary location of a multinational company substantially affects its worldwide tax liability. Japanese multinationals consistently face the highest ETRs.
American multinationals face among the highest ETRs. Tax haven multinationals enjoy the lowest ETRs. Multinationals and domestic-only firms face similar ETRs. ETRs fell worldwide over the last two decades, but the ordinal rank from high-tax countries to low-tax countries remained remarkably constant because all countries reduced their tax burdens. ETRs vary considerably across industries. A multinational's worldwide ETR is affected by the location of its foreign subsidiaries.
Understanding the role that domicile plays in multinational decisions is central to both scholarly and policy discussions about international taxes. Two decades ago, the taxation of multinationals was an obscure area of the law, understood by few practitioners, rarely mentioned in policy circles, and largely ignored by academe. Today, globalization has made the taxation of international commerce relevant to most businesses, central to policy discussions about jobs, trade, and competitiveness, and an area of interest to scholars in accounting, economics, finance, law, and related fields. The ETR estimates in this study should provide useful and needed quantitative information as policymakers, business, and scholars around the globe grapple with the complexities surrounding the taxation of multinational activities.
By shedding light on the importance of domicile for multinationals, the paper is particularly timely for American policymakers as the U.S. struggles to respond to Japan and the UK's recent decisions to adopt territorial taxation, which have left the U.S. as the sole major power still employing a system of worldwide taxation. To the ire of many U.S. Further work is warranted to understand how the tax order of countries has remained so steady over two decades of radical worldwide changes in tax policy, financial reporting, economic development, law, politics, technology, and many other areas. Although tax rates have fallen dramatically over the last 20 years, high-tax countries remain high-tax, and low-tax countries remain low-tax. Perhaps globalization permits countries to change their tax systems but forces a herding effect because tax changes in one country reverberate around the globe (see countries may find it difficult to sustain policies that do not conform to international norms. Table 1 This Table 2 This table presents the results of estimating on three separate samples, each with calculated as the tax measure in the column heading scaled by pretax income. The subcolumns titled Mean report the mean as reported on the financial statements. The subcolumns titled Estimate report the estimates of the coefficients. The Domestic Estimate is the estimate of for each country/group. The Multinational Estimate is the estimate of ( + for each country/group. All available observations were included in the estimation, but estimates are only reported for countries/groups having 50 or more observations. * indicates that is statistically significant at the 5% level. Table 4 This table reports the results of estimating for each industry (two-digit NAICS numbers included in each group are included in parentheses. Each cell reports the estimate of for the given country in the given industry. All firm-years in [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] in the industry were included in the regressions. Estimates are reported for country-industries with 20 or more observations. . Table 6 This table presents the results of estimating on a subsample of the sample described in Table   1 for which we have necessary subsidiary information. Each cell reports the estimate of for the interaction of the given parent and subsidiary variables. For example, the estimate of for the interaction term is 2.5. All interaction terms were included in the estimation, but estimates are only reported for cells with 50 or more observations. for all columns except the last. The last column reports the results of a separate regression with . 
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